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BoardofEducation ofIndependentSchool DistrictNo.
92 ofPottawatomieCounty v. Earls: Will Louisiana
Halt the United States Supreme Court's Continuous
Corrosion of Student Fourth Amendment Rights?
There is a circlearoundevery individualhuman beingwhich
no government ought to be permittedto overstep, that there
is, or ought to be, some space in human existence thus
entrenchedaroundandsacredfrom authoritarianintrusion.
No one who professes the smallestregardforhumanfreedom
ordignity can ever call this into question.
-Thomas Jefferson
INTRODUCTION

More than three decades have passed since the United States
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District recognized student constitutional rights by declaring
that constitutional protections are not shed at the schoolhouse gate
Today, in the twenty-first century, that statement has been the source
of many a footnote, but rarely a source ofapplication because student
rights have not only been shed, but have more or less evaporated. While
the Supreme Court has not yet abandoned Fourth Amendment
protections altogether for people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,' it has,
in essence, excluded schoolchildren from the definition of"people."
While some believe that statement to be harsh, this is,
unfortunately, the undeniable conclusion that can be reached by anyone
who has read BoardofEducationofIndependent School DistrictNo.
92 ofPottawatomieCounty v. Earls,5 which upheld a policy requiring
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

1. Kendall Vick, Records ofthe Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts, vol. VI, at 1072. Kendall Vick, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention of 1973, quoted Thomas Jefferson.
2. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733
(1969). Tinker involved a student-led protest ofU.S. involvement in the Vietnam
War. To illustrate their disapproval of U.S. involvement, the students wore black
armbands while on school grounds. The School District issued a policy prohibiting
the students from wearing these black armbands and the students sued. The United
States Supreme Court ruled that, absent any demonstration that these acts would
cause substantial disruption to the school's learning environment, the School
District'sprohibition of these acts was a violation ofthe students' First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech.
3. Id. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 736.
4. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
5. Rd. of Educ. ofIndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
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all students who participated in extracurricular activities to submit to
suspicionless drug testing despite minimal evidence ofa drug problem
within the school.6 In upholding the policy, the Supreme Court
basically trumped the government's "special need" to prevent and deter
student drug use over the rights proclaimed by that two-hundred-yearold contract we call the United States Constitution. Reading the
Court's opinion makes it difficult to ignore the possible future
ramifications. Although the world is currently experiencing a
widespread drug problem, truncating student Fourth Amendment rights
is not the answer. In the end, it may do more harm than good by
causing students to shy away from the one thing acknowledged to be a
deterrent from drug abuse-participation in student extracurricular
activities. Louisiana, however, may choose to provide its citizens a
remedy to prevent this continuing corrosion of individual rights. At
least one state has used its own constitution to strike down a student
drug-testing policy similar to the policy approved ofin Earls.7 In order
for Louisiana to preserve the fundamental liberties it holds dear, the
Louisiana Supreme Court should protect its citizens from unreasonable
governmental intrusion by applying Louisiana's constitution and
making a declaration that, while the United States Supreme Court has
appeared to have abandoned the maxim set out in Tinker, Louisiana
will continue to support the view that students do not shed their rights
at the-schoolhouse gate.
Part I of this article discusses two important Supreme Court cases
preceding Earls that involve constitutional challenges to student
searches. Part II, which discusses in detail the Earls opinion, is
followed by an analysis ofthe case using a balancing test set forth by
the Supreme Court. This analysis not only attempts to distinguish the
Earls policy from a previous policy upheld by the United States
Supreme Court, but illustrates the consequences Earlswill have in the
future. Part III then focuses on Louisiana's constitution, current
legislation, and jurisprudence to determine whether Louisiana will
prevent the continuous corrosion of student rights.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT SCHOOL SEARCHES PRECEDING EARLS

A. New Jersey v. T.L.0 8
T.L. 0. was the first Supreme Court case addressing Fourth
Amendment searches in the school context. There, school officials
536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
6. Id. at 838, 122 S. Ct. at 2569.
7. Theodore v. Delaware Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652 (Pa. Cmmw. 2000).
8. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
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searched a purse of a student suspected of smoking and came upon
marijuana cigarettes. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the evidence produced by the search
should be suppressed. The Court first began its analysis by declaring
that school officials are not exempt from Fourth Amendment
requirements merely because of their tutelary nature.9 In citing
Tinker, the Court stated that, "[i]f school authorities are state actors
for purposes ofthe constitutional guarantees offreedom ofexpression
and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be
deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when
conducting searches of their students."' The Court, however, held
the evidence to be admissible on the theory that there must be some
balancing test to accommodate both student privacy interests and the
substaitial need for school administrators and teachers to maintain
order and discipline within the schools." Therefore, in order to
maintain an adequate learning environment, school officials are not
bound by probable cause requirements and may search students ifthe
search is based on reasonable suspicion. In order to determine
whether the search passes constitutional muster, a test of
reasonableness must be performed
when conducting both criminal
2
and administrative searches.'
B. Veronia School District 47J v. Acton"3-Expanding the Scope
of Student Searches
In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled on the Veronia School
District's drug implementation policy that randomly tested student
athletes. The court held the policy constitutional when it refused to
apply a standard of reasonable suspicion. Instead, the court
formulated a three-part test to determine when Fourth Amendment
searches by school officials are reasonable. According to the Court,
one must look at (1) the nature of the privacy interest, 14 (2) the
character of the intrusion imposed by the policy,"5 and (3) the nature
and immediacy of the government's concerns.
Before fully introducing Veronia 'stest, it is important to note that
the Veronia School District faced extraordinary circumstances when
it decided to implement its drug-testing policy. A sharp increase in
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 336, 105 S.Ct.at 739-40.
Id., 105 S.Ct.at 740.
Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct.at 742.
Id. at 337, 105 S.Ct.at 740.
Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995).
Id.at 654, 115 S.Ct.at2391.
Id.at 658, 115 S.Ct.at 2393.
Id.at 660, 115 S.Ct.at 2394.
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student drug use was noted in the late 1980's. By the mid-1990's,
student drug use was so rampant that it was difficult for teachers to
control the students in the classroom, and many disciplinary
proceedings were held due to this widespread drug problem."
Students began to boast of their attraction to the drug culture and
some informed school officials that nothing could be done to solve
the problem. 8 Evidence also indicated that, not only were athletes
abusing drugs, but they were, in fact, the leaders of the drug culture.
Further, injuries sustained by student athletes had grown," causing
concern about student safety. This situation caused the School
District to implement the drug-testing policy requiring student
athletes to submit to random drug-testing.
1. The Nature of Veronia Athletes'PrivacyInterests
In determining the nature of the athletes privacy interests, the
Court stressed that students have a lesser expectation of privacy than
adults because ofthe tutelary nature that school officials exercise over
them, but that they retain legitimate privacy expectations
nonetheless.2 ° This privacy expectation is even less with student
athletes, who must abide by athletic rules and regulations and submit
to routine physical examinations. 2 Also, since athletic dressing
facilities do not have separate shower and dressing facilities, there is
an element of communal undress associated with athletic
participation.22 Student athletes in a school setting also have a lower
expectation of privacy because their adult counterparts are routinely
subjected to suspicionless drug testing. After weighing all ofthe facts
in the case, the Court determined that the nature of the privacy
interests purported by Veronia 's athletes was minimal.
2. Characterofthe IntrusionImposed by Veronia 'sPolicy
Urinary drug-testing has been determined to be a great intrusion
of privacy upon a person, but the Court has often looked to the
manner in which the test is conducted to determine the degree of that
intrusion.2 3 The Court analyzed the Veronia School District's testing
17. Id. at 648-49, 115 S. Ct. 2388-89.
18. Id. at 648, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
19. Veronia, 515 U.S. at 649, 115 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
20. Id. at 656, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
21. Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392-93.
22. Id., 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
23. Id.at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Executives' Assn., 489
U.S. 602, 626, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1418 (1989). Skinnerdeclared that the collection
of urinary samples intrudes upon "an excretory function traditionally shielded by
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procedure to determine whether the District's policy created an
unnecessary invasion of privacy. The plaintiffs in Veronia argued
that the Policy imposed a requirement on students selected for
random drug testing to produce their prescription medication
information beforehand,24 a requirement disapproved of in a prior
case involving random suspicionless drug-testing.25 However, the
Court refused to state that such requirements areperse unreasonable.
It instead accorded great deference to the School District, stating that,
"[i]t may well be that, if and when [students are] selected for random
testing at a time that [they are] taking medication, the School District
would have permitted [them] to provide the requested information in
a confidential manner...."26 The Court then examined the remainder
of the School District's drug-testing policy and concluded that the
tests were performed in a confidential manner."
3. NatureandImmediacy of the Government's Concerns
When analyzing the nature and immediacy of the government's
concerns, the Court found that the government's need to impose this
drug-testing policy among Veronia's athletes was compelling.
Veronia's educational process had been disrupted and other efforts to
curb student drug use had failed. The Court noted that the drugpolicy had been narrowly tailored to test only student athletes, where
there was an imminent risk ofphysical harm to both the drug user and
to his opponents. Various psychological effects of drug use could
have an alarming effect on a student athlete, including "impairment
ofjudgment, slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of
great privacy.").
24. Veronia, 515 U.S. at659-60, 115 S. Ct. at2394.
25. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27, 109 S.Ct. at 1418. The Court stressed in
Skinner that one of the factors in determining that the urinary testing was not a
significant invasion of privacy was the fact that railroad employees were not
required to submit beforehand information regarding current use of prescription
medication. Only after an employee tested positive was he required to supply the
medication information. This information was to be given to a licensed physician,
and not a governmental official.
26. Veronia, 515 U.S. at 660, 115 S.Ct. at 2394.
27. Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393. Under the District's Policy, the students
produce the urine samples in bathroom facilities. Male students produce the
samples at the urinal along a wall and remain fully clothed while observed from
behind. Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall while a female
monitor stands outside of the stall listening to sounds of tampering. The tests look
only for drugs and do not look for whether a student is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic. The drugs for which the tests screen are also standard in that they do not
vary according to the identity of the student. The results of the tests are disclosed
only to a limited number ofpersonnel who need to know and are not turned over to
law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function.
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pain," and "[the] particular drugs screened by the District's Policy
have been demonstrated to pose substantial physical risks to
athletes.""8
After determining that the School District had a profound need to
implement its drug testing policy, the Court found that the drug
problem could be substantially diminished by the District's drug
implementation policy. It seemed self-evident to the court that
controlling drug-use among athletes was of particular importance,
considering that the drug problem in the Veronia School District was
fueled mainly by the "role model" effect athletes had on their peers.29
Thus, the Court concluded that the School District's Drug Policy was
a legitimate means to obtain its ultimate governmental end,
specifically, obtaining an effective learning environment by
decreasing drug use among its students.
II. BOARD OFEDUCATIONOFINDEPENDENTDISTRICTNo. 92 OF
POTTA WA TOMIE COUNTY v. EARLS

After the Court's decision in Veronia, several school districts,
including the Tecumseh School District in Oklahoma, attempted to
enact drug-testing policies within their schools.30 Tecumseh's Drug
Policy was implemented in the fall of 1998 and required all students
who participated in any extracurricular activity to submit to a
suspicionless random drug test during the year, while a participant in
a school organization, and at any time upon a finding of reasonable
suspicion. 3 These extracurricular activities include, among others,
the Academic Team, Future Farmers of America (FFA), band, choir,
pom-pom, and cheerleading, as well as athletics.' 2
Following the implementation ofthe school district's drug policy,
two students at Tecumseh High School, with the support of their
parents, filed suit. Among the two was Lindsay Earls, a member of
the school choir, the marching band, and the Academic Team. The
suit challenged the constitutionality of the suspicionless drug testing
policy on the grounds that it was an unreasonable search and thus a
violation ofstudents' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures.33
28. Id. at 662, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
29. Id. at 663, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
30. Dana Hawkins, Trial By Vial. More Schools Give Urine Tests for
Drugs-But at What Cost? U.S. News (May 31, 1999), at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/archive/990531/1999053100113 _brief.php
(last visited April 20, 2004).
31. Earls,536 U.S. 822, 826, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2562-63.

32.
33.

Id.
Id.at 826-27, 122 S. Ct. at 2563.
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Since Veronia was controlling, the plaintiffs had to differentiate
the facts in Veronia from the present case. The plaintiffs argued that,
unlike the situation in Veronia,there was no ample evidence ofa drug
problem among the students in the Tecumseh School District and,
consequently, no "special need" to engage in urinary drug testing.
They also argued that students who engage in extracurricular
activities tend to be less likely to use drugs than the general student
population, and no evidence existed illustrating that students' privacy
expectations diminish when they participate in extracurricular
activities. 4
After applying the Veronia balancing test, the Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, upheld the School District's Drug Policy by noting
that extracurricular activities were voluntary and, most importantly,
that the government had a profound need to make sure that students
do not use and abuse illicit drugs. 5 The Court's decision thus created
a significant expansion of student drug testing. Even without
questioning the Court's decision in Veronia, it is difficult to
understand the wisdom behind its decision in Earls. Assuming that
Veronia was correct, the Supreme Court erred in applying its
balancing test, because of the stark differences in the circumstances
and the bad public policy that reasoning creates. The Court seems to
have "stretched and pulled" Veronia, restricting students' Fourth
Amendment
6 rights, in a manner that the Founders ofour nation never
intended.1
A. GreaterNatureofStudent PrivacyInterests
While a student's expectation ofprivacy is diminished somewhat
in schools, students are not totally void of reasonable privacy
expectations. Granted, school officials have a great interest in
maintaining discipline and order in the classroom to create a
productive learning environment for their students, but allowing the
government to tout its duty as schoolmaster as a reason to circumvent
the protections of the Fourth Amendment goes greatly beyond
T.L. O.'s mandate that student Fourth Amendment rights may not be
diluted any more than necessary to preserve order in the schools."
The government's job as schoolmaster, in addition to protecting the
safety of children and maintaining order in the classroom, includes
34. Id.
35. Id. at 829-30, 122 S.Ct. at 2564-65.
36. Denise Joubert, Note, Message in a Bottle: The United States Supreme
CourtDecision in Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 56 La. L. Rev. 959 (1996).
37. Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764
(S.D. Tex. 1989) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343, 105 S. Ct. 733,
743).
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respecting that students, too, are considered persons for reasons ofthe
Fourth Amendment and that they continue to retain legitimate
expectations ofprivacy when they enter the schoolhouse gate.
Just as all students have a legitimate expectation of privacy, so
too do students who participate in extracurricular activities. While
participation is not mandated by school officials, it is stressed.
Justice Ginsberg's dissent noted that extracurricular participation is
part of an educational program designed to factor into a child's
educational experience" so that students may "take full advantage of
the education offered them."3' 9 Because extracurricular activities are
part ofthe school's educational program, to deny students who refuse
to be drug-tested access to these programs would tend to lessen their
educational experience. Foregoing extracurricular participation
would also substantially lower students' opportunities to pursue
degrees ofhigher learning because participation is ofvital importance
to those who wish to gain acceptance to competitive institutions of
higher learning. Even students who maintain excellent grade point
averages may be turned away from a highly selective university if
they are lacking in extracurricular participation.4" Thus, because
participation in extracurricular activities is part of the school's
educational program and is a critical factor for universities who are
determining which students to accept, the term "voluntary" should not
be applicable. It is difficult to agree with Justice Ginsberg, however,
on how participation in non-athletic extracurricular activities is
different from participation in athletic extracurricular activities. All
students are encouraged to participate in any type of extracurricular
activity, whether it be athletic or otherwise, and all participants
depend on this participation to gain acceptance to universities.
Therefore, it may be argued that any type of extracurricular
participation is "involuntary."
However, even though athletes may be considered "involuntary"
participants, athletic and non-athletic participation are different.
While students who participate in extracurricular activities may also
be subjected to certain rules and regulations, they are not as stringent
as the rules and regulations imposed upon athletes. For example,
students on the Academic Team must maintain a certain grade point
average in order to qualify. This is a gross deviation from the
situation in Veronia in which student athletes were subjected to
routine physical examinations. Also, unlike athletes, there is no
element ofcommunal undress present for students who participate in
38. Earls, 536 U.S. at 846, 122 S. Ct. at 2573 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting); see
also Brief of Amici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics at 7, Earls.
39. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
40. Brief ofAmici Curiae American Academy of Pediatrics at 6, Earls.
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extracurricular activities. While athletes in a school setting may have
a lesser expectation of privacy because their adult counterparts are
routinely subjected to suspicionless drug tests, it would be absurd to
impute this reality to students who participate in non-athletic
extracurricular activities.41
B. Evidence of GreaterDegreeofIntrusion
While Tecumseh's Drug Policy set forward the same standards as
Veronia District's Drug Policy, Lindsay Earls contended that the
school did not adhere to its guidelines. She alleged that the personal
information was carelessly handled and its confidentiality
compromised. According to Lindsay, prescription drug sheets were
routinely viewed by her choir teacher, who also kept the files in
places that were easily accessible. The test results were also given to
all activity sponsors who claimed they had a great need to know the
results.42 This was contrary to the District's policy that required that
the "medication list shall be submitted to the lab in a sealed and
confidential envelope and shall not be viewed by district
' Despite these allegations, the Court granted summary
employees."43
judgment for the Tecumseh School District. Justice Ginsberg, in her
dissent, argued that the District Court gave substantial deference to
the School District," even though it had been widely held that, in the
stage of summary judgment, "doubtful matters should not have been
resolved in favor of the judgment seeker."' 5 Since the plaintiffs
opposed the motion for summaryjudgment, the evidence should have
been viewed in the light most favorable to them. The consequence of
permitting summary judgment without resolving any material issues
offact entices school districts that have enacted drug-testing policies
to subsequently violate the terms ofthe policies.
Since we will never know whether any truth to these allegations
existed, it is difficult to determine whether the degree of intrusion in
this circumstance exceeded the degree of intrusion in Veronia.
Assuming that the allegations are correct, however, would mean that
41. Earls, 536 U.S. at 845-48, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2573-74 (Ginsberg, J.
dissenting).
42. Id. at 847-50, 122 S. Ct. at 2574-75, (Ginsberg, . dissenting).
43. Id. (citing Respondents' Brief at 6, Earls).
44. Id. at 849, 122 S. Ct. at 2575, (quoting Bd. ofEduc. ofIndep. Sch. District
No. 92 ofPottawatomie County v. Earls, 115 F. Supp.2d. 1281, 1293 (W.D. Okla.
2000)). The District Court stated that, since the Drug Policy, "expressly provides
for confidentiality of test results, ... the Court must assume that the confidentiality
provisions will be honored.").
45. Id.at 849, 122 S. Ct. at 2575 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) (citing United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962)).
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the drug testing was not performed in the least intrusive manner and
unnecessarily compromised an individual's legitimate need for
privacy.
C. No ProfoundNature and Immediacy of Tecumseh School
District's Concerns
Without question, the nature and immediacy of the Tecumseh
School District's concerns pale in comparison to the concerns that the
Veronia School District faced. The only evidence of a drug problem
that the District could produce happened to be a small number of
occurrences from the 1970's.46 Equally ironic is the fact that the
Tecumseh School District repeatedly boasted to the federal
government that it did not have a drug problem within its schools and
any drug use that may have been occurring was decreasing each
year.47 While there was no demonstration by the District of drug
abuse among Tecumseh's students, there was even less of a
demonstration of drug abuse among those students who participated
in extracurricular activities. On the contrary, an amicus brief filed by
the American Academy of Pediatrics contained research that
illustrated a correlation between participation in extracurricular
activities and abstinence from drugs. Evidence indicated that
students who did not engage in extracurricular activities were fortynine percent more likely to engage in illicit drug use than students
who chose to participate in extracurricular activities.48 Thus, the
School District could not, and did not, assert that they were
implementing the drug policy in response to an epidemic among a
certain group of students, making it an unlikely conclusion that an
immediate governmental concern was present in Tecumseh's schools.
The majority made the argument that it would not allow drug use to
become an epidemic in schools before the government could step in
to combat the problem. While this statement may be good public
policy, it does not necessarily mean that it is constitutional. In a prior
case involving suspicionless drug testing, Justice Scalia noted that the
46. Bd. of Educ. oflndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
47. Respondents' Brief at 1, Earls.
48. Brief of Amici Curiae American Academy ofPediatrics at 10, Earls(citing
N. Zill et al., Adolescent Time Use, Risky Behaviors and Outcomes (U.S. Pub.
Health Serv. 1995) (stating that "students who reported spending no time in schoolsponsored activities were [forty-nine] percent more likely to have used drugs"; L.

Shilts, The Relationship of Early Adolescent Substance Use to Extracurricular

Activities, PeerInfluence, and PersonalAttitudes, 26 Adolescence 613, 615 (Fall
1991) (finding that among adolescents studied, "the non[drug] using group reported
significantly higher involvement in extracurricular activities as compared to the

using and abusing groups").
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person implementing the policy must rely on demonstrated realities,
or else a "kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in
symbolic opposition to drug use" occurs.49 Ironically, Scalia joined
the majority in Earls,giving testament to the majority's belief that
the doctrine ofin locoparentisis supreme to the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.5" To the contrary, the doctrine of
in loco parentis does not authorize school officials to conduct
suspicionless drug tests on all students who engage in extracurricular
activities. Instead, it is designed to narrowly delegate a subset of
parental authority to school officials-the authority to take necessary
steps to protect students and maintain order in the classroom. The
doctrine does not, and should not, usurp parents' rights to raise their
children as they see fit, absent justified reasons of school safety or
discipline." This doctrine was invoked in Veronia, where there
existed an open rebellion in the classroom, and the necessity to
protect the safety of student athletes similarly existed. It could not
have been reasonably applied in this case, however, where the
Tecumseh School Board failed to demonstrate that the policy was
enacted to preserve student safety and order in the classroom.
Tecumseh argued the existence of an immediate need to maintain
discipline and order in its schools, yet the Tecumseh "drug culture,"
if one existed at all, is dwarfed by the extraordinary troubles that
faced the Veronia School District. While school administrators in
Veronia described the rapid increase in schoolroom disruptions,
disciplinary reports, and student boasting indicating that there was
little officials could do to combat the drug problem, an increase in
classroom disruption failed to occur in Tecumseh's schools.
Tecumseh's Drug Policy, therefore, goes beyond the government's
duties to maintain order and discipline in order to achieve a safe and
productive learning environment.
In addition, the Court erred in applying the "special needs"
exception to Earls. Veronia indicated that a "special need" existed
49. Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681, 109 S. Ct.
1384, 1399 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
50. Oral Arguments at 40-41, Earls. Justice Scalia's statement to plaintiff's
counsel, Graham A. Boyd:
And-and what I miss in your argument is any recognition of the fact that
we are dealing with minors. I mean, you're talking here about a search
rather than a seizure, but in the case of minors, you can keep them, in
effect, imprisoned after school, can you not, if they haven't done their
homework or something else? The school is standing in loco parentis. It
is trying to train and raise these young people to be responsible adults.
And I think that-it's a-it's a world of difference from-from what-from
what the State can do with regard to adults.
51. Brief ofAmici Curiae Jean Burkett at 1, Earls.
52. Veronia, 515 U.S. at 648, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
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because the Veronia School District's policy was narrowly directed
toward student athlete drug use, where there is an imminent risk of
physical harm to both the athlete and to his opponent. s3 On the other
hand, Tecumseh's Drug Policy failed to demonstrate how students
who participate in extracurricular activities such as the Academic
Team, choir and band are deemed to be in grave physical danger if
they compete while using drugs.
The Court has made various exceptions to the warrant
requirement, administrative searches being listed as one of those
exceptions. Those searches arejustified when a "special need" exists.
The concept of "special needs" ironically was first addressed in
TL.O. when Justice Blackmun stated, "[o]nly in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs [exist], beyond the normal need
for law enforcement,.., is a court entitled to substitute its balancing
of interests for that of the Framers." 4 This "special needs" concept
was first applied by the Court in the context of suspicionless drugtesting in the cases of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association" andNationalTreasuryEmployees v. Von Raab.s6 Both
involved circumstances in which danger of life or limb was at issue.
No such circumstances were proven to have existed in Tecumseh.
1. Skinner andVon Raab-ImmediateDangerto Life orLimb
Skinner involved a constitutional challenge to The Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which authorized the Secretary of
Transportation to "prescribe as necessary, appropriate rules
regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety.""5
Pursuant to this act, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
issued a regulation requiring railroad employees involved in railway
accidents to submit to blood and urine testing.5" In upholding the
regulation, the Court first pointed out significant problems ofon-thejob intoxication in the railroad industry and focused on data
illustrating that various railway accidents had occurred at the hands
of intoxicated employees.59 After concluding that governmental
collection of blood and urine samples implicated the Fourth

53. Id. at 662, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
54. TL.O., 69 U.S. at 352, 105 S. Ct. at 748.
55. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402.
56. Von Raab,489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384.
57. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606, 109 S. Ct. at 1407.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 607, 109 S. Ct. at 1407. The FRA found that, from 1972 to 1983, onthe-job intoxication led to at least 21 train accidents, resulting in 25 fatalities, 61
non-fatal injuries, and $19 million in property damage.
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Amendment, 60the Court stated that the "Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are
unreasonable."'" In turning to the reasonableness analysis, the Court
invoked the "special needs" test, balancing both the employee's
privacy interest with the government's exceptional need to preserve
the safety ofpassengers and neighboring communities, as well as the
employees themselves.62 Because the government's interest in
preventing railroad accidents was so compelling, there existed a
"special need," going beyond the need of law enforcement,63 to ensure
the safety of the thousands ofpeople who travel by train each day.
Von Raab also involved a constitutional challenge to
suspicionless drug testing. The Commissioner of the United States
Customs Service implemented a drug-testing program that required
all Customs employees who met one or more of three criteria to
submit to suspicionless drug testing. 64 The employees required to
submit to this testing were those employees who (1)were involved in
either drug interdiction or enforcement, (2) carried firearms, or (3)
handled classified material that might fall into the hands of
smugglers.60 The Court noted that a "special need" existed because
the "Customs Service's drug-testing program [was] not designed to
serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement. '66 Because many
customs employees are frequently exposed to both bribery from
traffickers and temptation to use and abuse illegal drugs that are
readily accessible, a special need existed.67 An agent who abuses
drugs can be susceptible to these temptations, which may have the
potential to eventually cause a breach in national security or
substantial injuries to human beings.68
After Skinner and Von Raab were decided, some scholars
criticized the Court for broadening the Fourth Amendment "special
need" requirement in administrative searches,69 while others stated
that the specific circumstances in the cases and the narrow range of
employees affected bythe drug test would not unnecessarily diminish
Fourth Amendment protections.

60. Id. at 619, 109 S. Ct. at 1414.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 352, 105 S. Ct. 733, 748 (1985).
64. Nat'l Treasury Employee's Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,660-61,109
S. Ct. 1389, 1388 (1989).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 666, 109 S. Ct. at 1391.
67. Id. at 669, 109 S. Ct. at 1392.
68. Id. at 670, 109 S. Ct. at 1393.
69. Schulhofer, On the FourthAmendment Rights ofthe Law-Abiding Public,
1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 87 (1987).
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[I]t is evident, both from the careful fact-specific balancing
process that the Court employed in both cases, and in
particular from the partial remand of the regulations at issue
in Von Raab in order to narrow the range of employees on
whom they would be imposed, that the Fourth Amendment
does not permit suspicionless drug testing regimes to be
imposed indiscriminately on [those] who do not actually
perform jobs that justify such an imposition. 0
2. Chandler v. Miller7 -Good PublicPolicy,but No "Special
Need"
These optimistic scholars appeared to be correct in their
assumption that the "special needs" would only be invoked when
substantial danger to life or limb existed when the Court refused to
extend the "special needs" exception to a policy that subjected all
candidates who ran for public office to a suspicionless drug test in
order to qualify. Only in exceptional circumstances, the Court noted,
would it depart from the requirement of a warrant or individualized
suspicion."' The state's claim that drug use was incompatible with
holding high state office was not important enough to override the
candidates' privacy interests.73 Because there was no evidence of a
drug problem among state officials, a denial of the government's
attempt to depart from constitutional mandates protecting an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy was appropriate.
Public officials did not present the justifiable safety concern present
in Skinner and Von Raab; specifically, they did not engage in the
high-risk safety-sensitive tasks that would have given the government
sufficient justification to impose a drug-testing policy.
While the Supreme Court has attempted to use Skinner and Von
Raab as justification that suspicionless drug testing policies like the
Tecumseh School District's are reasonable, Earls seems more
analogous to Chandler in that: (1) students who participate in
extracurricular activities do not engage in high-risk safety-sensitive
tasks; and (2) no evidence of a drug problem exists within the
Tecumseh schools. Participation in extracurricular activities can
hardly be described as highly safety-sensitive. Images of "out-ofcontrol cutlery, animals run amok, and colliding tubas"7 4 belong more
70. John Devlin & David Hilburn, Louisiana ConstitutionalLaw, 52 La. L.
Rev. 575, 590 (1992).
71. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997).
72. Id.at 308, 117 S. Ct. at 1297.
73. Id. at 318, 117 S. Ct. at 1303.
74. Brief of Amici Curiae American Academy ofPediatrics at 27, Earls.
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to the creative writers at Pixar than legal scholars. Thus, when
"public safety is not genuinely inj eopardy the Fourth [and Fourteenth
Amendments] preclude suspicionless search[es], no matter how
conveniently arranged.""5
3. PossibleRamificationsof the Earls decision
In declaring Earls to be similar to Von Raab and Skinner, the
Court's reasoning may invoke severe consequences to students.
Students who refuse to have their privacy rights violated must abstain
from extracurricular competition, which, as discussed previously, will
lessen their educational experience and diminish their opportunities
to gain acceptance to institutions of higher learning. Earlsopens the
door to a greater expansion of suspicionless drug testing throughout
the nation. It is not denied that drug abuse is and will continue to be
a nationwide crisis, but governmental efforts to combat the use of
drugs in our society should be done within the confines ofthe United
States Constitution. The need for vigilance against unconstitutional
excess is so great precisely because the need for action against the
drug crisis is manifest.7 The zealots, sacrificing fundamental
freedoms in the name of exigency, ultimately find their enthusiasm
turns into regret."
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason oftheir real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts thejudgment. These immediate interests
exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even
well settled principles of law will bend.78
The Court has certainly bent well settled principles of law by
declaring that the importance of combating the nationwide drug
problem subverts student privacy interests. To make such a
declaration is to reduce the United States Constitution to a trivial state
and calls to mind Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead
v. UnitedStates:79 "[flor good or for ill, [our Government] teaches the
75. Chandler,520 U.S. 305, 323, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
76. Skinner,489 U.S. 602, 635, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1423 (1989) (Marshall, J.
dissenting).

77. Id.

78. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01, 24 S. Ct. 436, 468
(1904).
79. Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,48 S. Ct. 564 (1928), overruled
by, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 91, 87 S. Ct. 1873 (1967).
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whole people by its example. 8 0 Likewise, schools should teach their
students by example. However, the Court has permitted the use of
symbolic measures, substantially diminishing student constitutional
protections8' by teaching students "to discount important principles
of our government as mere platitudes." 2 What a tragedy to have
school administrators stress to their students to respect a two-hundred
year-old constitution, while simultaneously allowing administrators
to deny their students basic protections provided in that very
constitution.
Because of the apparent failure to meet any of Veronia's criteria
and the majority's statement that the most important justification for
allowing such a drug policy was that the Drug Policy was undertaken
in furtherance of the government's tutelary responsibilities, 3 one
wonders whether the Court will continue to bend well-settled
principles of law until these principles are so curved that they snap
beyond repair. Earls is clearly an omen that the broadening of
"special needs" in the school context will continue until all students
may be subjected to urinary drug testing.
1I. WHAT CAN LOUISIANA Do?

A. InterpretingArticle 1, Section 5 ofthe LouisianaConstitution
While the Supreme Court has blatantly ignored the Fourth
Amendment and Tinker, the predicament described above is
nevertheless the state of the law today.Y A possible solution to this
problem is to have states apply their own constitutions to rule student
suspicionless drug testing unconstitutional. While some courts have
agreed to use their state constitutions to determine whether such
random drug testing policies are constitutional, Louisiana is one of
the many state courts that has yet to address the problem.
Article 1, Section 5to the Louisiana Constitution expressly states:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communication, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasion of privacy. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath
80. Id. at 485, 48 S. Ct. at 575.
81. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 854, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 2578 (2002) (Ginsberg, J.
dissenting).
82. W. Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 63 S. Ct. 1178,
1185 (1943).
83. Earls,536 U.S. at 830, 122 S. Ct. at 2565.
84. Justice Jackson once stated, "The Court is not final because it is infallible.
It is infallible because it is final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540, 73 S. Ct.

397, 427 (1953).
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, the person or things to be seized, and the lawful
purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely
affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court.8 5
While both the United States Constitution and the Louisiana
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, Louisiana
courts have tended to grant broader constitutional rights in spite of
numerous United States Supreme Court decisions narrowing the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.86 Justice Dennis, a delegate to the
Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973, stated in State v.
7
Hernandez,1

Our state constitution's declaration of the right to privacy
contains an affirmative establishment of a right ofprivacy,
explicit protections against unreasonable searches, seizures,
or invasions of property and communications, as well as
houses, papers and effects, and gives standingto any person
adversely affected by a violation of these safeguards to raise
the illegality in the courts. This constitutional declaration of
right is not a duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely
coextensive with it; it is one of the most conspicuous
instances in which our citizens have chosen a higher standard
of individualized liberty than that afforded by the
jurisprudence interpreting the federal constitution. 8
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Hernandez, departed from
federal jurisprudence to determine whether a search was reasonable.
That case involved the search ofan automobile pursuant to an arrest.
The defendant there was arrested for driving while intoxicated. After
being taken to the station, his car, which was parked in his driveway,
was towed, but not before a search was performed. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in excluding the contraband found in the vehicle,
narrowed the United States Supreme Court's holding in New York v.
Belton"9 and concluded that an officer is prohibited from searching
85. La. Const. art. 1,§ 5.
86. Richard P. Bullock, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitutionof.1974: The Louisiana Supreme CourtandCivilLiberties,51 La. L.

Rev. 787 (1991).
87. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
88. Id. at 1385 (citation omitted).
89. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). In Belton, the

United States Supreme Court allowed, as an incident ofarrest, an officer to search
both the passenger compartment of a vehicle and the contents of any containers
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passenger compartments when the arrestee has been handcuffed and
removed from the scene. 90 Noting that some differences existed
between Belton and this case, the court stated that Belton was an
incorrect rule of police conduct under Louisiana's constitution. 9'
Instead, the court declared that, when a custodial arrest is made, in
order to protect the arresting officer, the officer may only conduct a
prompt warrantless search ofthe arrestee and the area from which the
arrestee could gain possession ofa weapon or destructible evidence. 92
The court would not allow federal jurisprudence to replace its own
independent judgment in construing Louisiana's constitution.
Also at issue are the decisions of State v. Parns93 and State v.
Church,9' which involved the invalidation of sobriety checkpoints.
In Parms, the court explicitly stated that Louisiana's constitution
affords its citizens greater protections than the federal constitution."
Therefore, the sobriety checkpoint challenged in this case constituted
a violation of the defendant's rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Church invalided sobriety checkpoints altogether.
Here, the Louisiana Supreme Court was even more explicit in its
determination that the Louisiana Constitution provides an expansion
of individual rights not afforded by the Fourth Amendment. The
court stated that the departure from the wording of the Fourth
Amendment signaled a conscious decision by the citizens of
Louisiana to provide a higher standard ofindividualized liberty than
the United States Constitution. Accordingly, sobriety checkpoints
could not pass constitutional muster under Article 1, Section 5.
Despite these pronunciations, and after a United States Supreme
Court decision sanctioning the use of sobriety checkpoints, 97 the
inside of that compartment.
90. Hernandez,410 So. 2d at 1385.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Statev. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988), overruledby, Statev. Jackson,
764 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000).
94. State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989), overruledby, State v. Jackson,
764 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000).
95. Parms,523 So. 2d at 1303. The court stated that:
Louisiana, like Oregon and New Hampshire, provides greater state
constitutional protection for individual rights than that provided by the
Fourth Amendment. The court of appeal failed to consider the
constitutionality of this seizure under the Louisiana Constitution. The
expanded protection of individual freedom read into the Oregon and New
Hampshire Constitutions is explicit in the Louisiana Constitution, which
protects against not only searches and seizures but unreasonable invasions
ofprivacy.
96. Church, 538 So. 2d at 996.
97. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481
(1990).
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Louisiana Supreme Court reversed itself. State v. Jackson9' not only
held that sobriety checks were constitutional, but indicated that the
Louisiana Constitution does not, in fact, provide an extension of
protections with regard to unreasonable searches and seizures. The
court noted that since the clause in Article 1, Section 5 was identical
to the Fourth Amendment's clause against unreasonable searches and
seizures, there was no discemable difference between the two
provisions, thus demonstrating an intent by the drafters to parallel the
federal constitution.99
It is difficult to determine whether Jackson will be narrowly
construed to apply only to instances involving searches of motor
vehicles, or broadly interpreted to apply to all cases involving
allegations ofunreasonable searches and seizures. Extending Jackson
beyond automobile searches will undeniably be taking a step
backward from long-held jurisprudence and the widespread belief
among the citizens of Louisiana that their constitution affords them
greater protection than its federal counterpart.
B. The LouisianaLegislatureandSuspicionlessDrug-Testing
Since there are no Louisiana Supreme Court decisions discussing
the constitutionality ofrandom drug-testing under Article 1, Section
5, it is important to determine whether the Louisiana Legislature will
provide any help to solve the problem that Earls has caused. It is
difficult to know whether the legislature will provide any relief
because, in a series ofrecent statutory enactments, and in response to
what the legislature noted as a "state ofemergency"' ° with respect to
widespread drug use throughout the state, the legislature has
mandated suspicionless drug-testing to either (1) anyperson receiving
anything of economic value from the state, "° or (2) any adult
receiving welfare assistance from the state. 0 2 Considering that many
people receiving governmental benefits need the assistance to
98. State v. Jackson, 764 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000).

99. Id. at 71.
100. La. R.S. 49:102 l(A)(1) (2003) states in part: "The legislature does hereby
declare that a state of emergency exists inLouisiana as a result of the spiraling

increases of abuse of illegal substances by its citizens. The legislature further
declares that such illegal drug abuse presents a clear and present danger to the
health, welfare, and security ofthe state, its citizens, and government."
101. La. R.S. 49:1021(B) (2003). This provision ofthe statute states that:

The commissioner of administration shall establish and administer a
program for random drug testing for all persons who receive anything of

economic value or receive funding from the state or an entity thereof,
including but not limited to, all persons awarded state contracts to provide
goods or services or loans from a state or an entity thereof.
102. La. R.S. 46:460:10 (2003).
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survive, it can hardly be argued that the receipt of assistance is
voluntary. The statute lacks a "special need" other than the special
need to deter drug use. Under Chandler,because no other special
need can be ascertained from the statutory provisions, the two
enactments should undoubtedly fail constitutional muster, even under
the Fourth Amendment, although it would be interesting to see how
the Louisiana Supreme Court interprets Article 1, Section 5, should
a constitutional challenge ever arise.
While the two recent legislative enactments seem to encompass
virtually every citizen in Louisiana, Louisiana Revised Statute
49:1015 " imposes stringent conditions on state employees who wish
to implement employee drug-testing programs. The statute requires
that some showing of reasonable suspicion is necessary to justify a
drug-test,"M unless the employee occupies "safety-sensitive or
103. La. R.S. 49:1015 (2003) provides in pertinent part:
A. A public employer may require, as a condition of continued

employment, samples from his employees to test for the presence ofdrugs
following an accident during the course and scope of his employment,
under other circumstances which result in reasonable suspicion that drugs
are being used, or as a part of a monitoring program established by the
employer to assure compliance with terms of a rehabilitation agreement.
B. A public employer may require samples from prospective employees,
as a condition of hiring, to test for the presence of drugs.
C. A public employer may implement a program ofrandom drug testing
of those employees who occupy safety-sensitive or security-sensitive
positions.
D. Any public employee drug testing shall occur pursuant to a written
policy, duly promulgated, and shall comply with the provisions of this
Chapter.
E. In the event the Louisiana State Racing Commission shall require or
conduct drug testing on its employees, agents, and representatives, the
Commission shall comply with the provisions of this Part and the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act as well as seek prior approval of
the procedures ofthe drug testing by the appropriate legislative oversight
committee. The failure of the State Racing Commission to receive the
required legislative approval shall negate all test results conducted under
the non-approved procedures. Any drug testing program or procedure
required or conducted by the State Racing Commission shall be applicable
and include the members of the State Racing Commission.
F. (1) A public employer shall require samples to test for the presence
of drugs, as a condition of hiring, from prospective employees whose
principle responsibilities of employment include operating a public
vehicle, performing maintenance on a public vehicle, or supervising any
public employee who operates or maintains a public vehicle.
(2) A public employer shall implement a program of random drug
testing of those employees whose principal responsibility is to operate
public vehicles, maintain public vehicles, or supervise any public
employee who drives or maintains public vehicles.
104. La. R.S. 49:1015(A).
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security-sensitive" positions. ' °s This requirement is in line with
Skinner and Von Raab.
Louisiana Revised Statute 49:1021 has also partly invalidated a
prior holding by the Fourth Circuit that upheld random suspicionless
drug-testing on licensees of the Louisiana Racing Commission.0 6
Holthusv. LouisianaStateRacing Commissionheld that the state had
a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the horse racing
industry, but the statute now requires the Louisiana State Racing
Commission to abide by the legislative statute. Therefore, only when
a licensee is involved in a safety-sensitive position may that licensee
be subjected to random drug-testing.
C. What Will LouisianaDo?
It is difficult to foresee the future, to predict what the Louisiana
legislature and Louisiana courts will do. Since the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson seems to signal a reluctance to
stray from federal jurisprudence, opponents ofunreasonable random
drug-testing policies may have little hope. Also, considering the
vastness that La. R.S.49:1021 encompasses, and the fact that La. R.S.
49:1015 is consistent with federal jurisprudence only, the legislature
may provide little consolation. Thus, even though the drafters ofthe
Louisiana Constitution may have intended to offer the citizens of
Louisiana greater protection from government intrusion than the
protection offered by the federal constitution, this broader protection
will undoubtedly cease to exist at the mercy of the Louisiana courts
and legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because of the United States Supreme Court's significant
expansion of student drug testing, it is questionable whether Tinker
is still good case law. Not only has the majority bent to public
pressures, but student rights have been similarly twisted as a result.
Student rights have taken a back door to public opinion. The
Tecumseh School District lacked the significant drug problem that
existed in Veronia and, since students who participate in extracurricular activities are the ones least likely to engage in illicit drug
use, it is hard to believe that the drug-testing regime instituted by the
School District will have any impact on the School District's claim
to protect students from engaging in drug abuse.
Before
105. La. R.S. 49:1015(C).
106. See Holithus v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 580 So. 2d 469 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1991).
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implementing drug-testing programs such as the one implemented in
Earls,school districts must evaluate the consequences that such drugtesting programs may have. In the end, more harm than good will
occur, for students will shy away from extra-curricular activities at
the thought of being subjected to such a great bodily intrusion.
It was once believed that the Louisiana Constitution afforded its
citizens greater protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures than its federal counterpart. However, after Jackson, one
wonders whether the Louisiana Supreme Court will continue to take
misguided steps down the road of totalitarianism and fascism, or
revert back to its former principals. If it chooses the former, in the
end, not only will the students be harmed, but society as a whole will
be as well. Little by little, constitutional protections that our
Founding Fathers instituted and our citizens have so enjoyed will
cease to exist. The Court has definitely bent a well-settled
principal
07
of law, and this time, it might not snap back so easily.1
Ashley S. Green*

107. Skinner,489 U.S. 602, 655, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1432 (1989) (Marshall, J.
dissenting). Justice Marshall, in his dissent, stated:
A majority of this court, swept away by society's obsession with stopping
the scourge of illegal drugs, today succumbs to the popular pressures
described by Justice Holmes. In upholding the FRA's plan for blood and
urine testing, the majority bends time-honored and textually based
principles of the Fourth Amendment - principles the Framers ofthe Bill of
Rights designed to ensure that the Government has a strong and
individualizedjustification when it seeks to invade an individual's privacy.
I believe the Framers would be appalled by the vision of mass
governmental intrusions upon the integrity of the human body that the
majority allows to become reality. The immediate victims of the
majority's constitutional timorousness will be those railroad workers
whose bodily fluids the Government may now forcibly collect and analyze.
But ultimately, today's decision will reduce the privacy all citizens may
enjoy, for, as Justice Holmes understood, principles of law, once bent, do
not snap back easily.
* I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Professor John Devlin for his
insight and guidance in developing this note. I thank my parents, Frederic and
Beth, and husband Chad for their love and support through such a rough year. I
love you and I hope I have made you proud. Idedicate this note to two people.
To my late grandfather, Ted Cormier-here in spirit and always in my heart, thank
you for teaching me the value ofan education and the importance offamily. To my
son, Aidan-may you grow to love and respect your country and stand up for your
rights that so many have died for.

